brett fenton wrote:

> We can clear this up right now I believe. 
> 
> The domain in question is netrider.org.au, NetRegistry is the Registrar
> of the domain name. 
> 
> The legal entity owning the name is:
> 
> Registrant:              LS1 Owners Club of Australia
> Registrant ID:           ABN 53415321024

Which has been maliciously changed since 16:26 this afternoon from a 
registrant of "Netriders Australia" to what you see above, when 
NetRegistry was formally requested by fax from Netrider to change the 
contact name and supply the domain password to the new contacts.

NetRegistry contacted the incorrect contact name listed on the domain 
record in response to the fax. This person, or NetRegistry, have since 
16:26 this afternoon modified the domain record. Obviously it is a 
malicious pre-emptive attack in an attempt to difuse Netrider as the 
legal leasee of netrider.org.au

In email responses to the NetRegistry Sales Manager this afternoon, 
Netrider specifically advised that the domain contact name had no 
authority from Netrider and any attempts from this person to claim they 
are a representative of Netrider is false and fraudulent. Yet, 
NetRegistry have still allowed the domain record to be maliciously updated.

Netrider, Netrider.org.au, and Netriders Australia is a legal 
organisation under ABN 20 358 868 741 and with Victorian Business Name 
registration and a Trademark on the Netrider name. This has all been 
communicated to NetRegistry and it's Sales Manager. In addition to 
netrider.org.au, Netrider is also the legal leasee of netrider.com.au 
and netrider.net.au

> On checking ABR the ABN matches the specified business name. My
> understanding is from the one piece of internal communication I've seen
> between Jason and a member of NetRegistry is that Jason is confusing the
> Registrant and the Registrant/Technical/Admin contacts. 

No confusion. As I stated, since 16:26 this afternoon the domain record 
for the registrant has been maliciously changed from "Netriders 
Australia" to what you outline above. The registrantID has also been 
maliciously changed since 16:26 this afternoon


> We have procedures in place where for example if an authorized contact left an
> organization, an offier of the legal entity can follow a process that
> requests we modify the appropriate contacts.

As per the fax sent to NetRegistry at 16:26 this afternoon, which has 
resulted in the malicious change to the domain record.


-- 
Cheers,
Jason